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BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, District Court Judge 
1 
CTX Financial, Inc. and Mike Vardakis, appellees herein, 
espectfully request that this Court affirm the determination of 
he Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
residing, on such grounds as follow: 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-
(k) , Utah Code Annotated. This case was transferred to the Court 
f Appeals from the Supreme Court• 
STATEMENT OP THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether there is evidence in the record to support the 
inding of the trial court that Carolyn Murphy had an ownership 
rterest in the piano, and therefore, the determination of the 
rial court should be affirmed? 
2. Whether there is evidence in the record to support the 
Lnding of the trial court that Carolyn Murphy had a legal right to 
iwn the piano or otherwise use it as collateral for loans that she 
stained, and therefore, to affirm the decision of the trial court? 
THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The trial judge is considered to be in the best position to 
jsess the credibility of the witnesses and to derive a sense of 
Le proceeding as a whole. State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah 
2 
1994) . The appellate court is not in the same position to 
determine factual disputes and it is because of this disadvantage 
that the appellate court affords deference to the lower court. 
Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle 
Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987). 
Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court under the 
clearly erroneous standard. For the Court of Appeals to find clear 
error, it must decide that the factual findings made by the trial 
court are not adequately supported by the record while resolving 
all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
determination of the trial court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 
(Utah 1994) ; see also Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P. 2d 
250, 252 (Utah 1985). 
On April 5, 1995, Judge Timothy R. Hanson filed a Memorandum 
Decision indicating that Carolyn Murphy had an ownership interest 
in the property. R. 786. The Decision was incorporated into 
Findings of Fact that must be given deference. The trial court's 
factual findings are supported by the record, including the 
testimony from the witnesses and the exhibits offered during the 
course of the trial. 
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STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
30-2-9/ Utah Code Annotated, 
amily expenses - Joint and several liability. 
The expenses of the family and the education of the children 
re chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife or of 
ither of them, and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or 
eparately. (1953) 
30-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
ife's rights in property - Liability for husband/s debts. 
Real and personal estate of every female acquired before 
arriage, and all property to which she may afterwards become 
ntitled by purchase, gift, grant, inheritance, bequest or devise, 
hall be and remain the estate and property of such female, and 
hall not be liable for the debts, obligations or engagements of 
er husband, and may be conveyed, devised or bequeathed by her as 
f she were unmarried. (1953) 
70A-2-403, Utah Code Annotated, 
ower to transfer - Good faith purchase of goods - "Entrusting." 
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his 
ransferor had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of 
limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the 
riterest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to 
ransfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When 
Dods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the 
archaser has such power even though 
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the 
purchaser, or 
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is 
later dishonored, or 
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a 'cash 
sale,' or 
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as 
larcenous under the criminal law. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a factual determination of the trial 
court whereby Carolyn Murphy was found to have an ownership 
interest in a piano. As a result of this factual finding, the 
trial court determined that Carolyn could convey that interest, and 
could subsequently sell the piano to a bona fide purchaser. 
Course of Proceedings 
1. Appellee, CTX Financial, filed the Complaint to initiate 
the above-referenced case on February 27, 1992. R. 2. 
2. An Answer and Cross Claim was filed by AAA Jewelers and 
Mike Vardakis on March 16, 1992. R. 80. 
3. On May 21, 1992, a default judgment in favor of CTX was 
entered against Carolyn Murphy. R. 164. 
4. On November 9, 1992, Harry Murphy filed his Answer to the 
Complaint. R. 277. 
1
 An Addendum has not been compiled or included with this 
Brief because it does not appear to be necessary to provide 
documentation other than as provided within this Brief and/or by 
Harry Murphy in his Brief of Appellant. 
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5. Harry Murphy filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 
4, 1992. R. 320. 
6. On August 24, 1993, Carolyn Murphy filed a petition for 
elief under chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, with 
he United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, 
entral Division, thereby making applicable the automatic stay 
gainst creditor action. R. 839. 
7. On November 12, 1993, Judge Timothy R. Hanson denied the 
Dtion for Summary Judgment filed by Harry Murphy because of the 
Kistence of genuine and material issues of fact regarding the 
tfnership of the piano. R. 711. 
8. On March 7-8, 1994, a trial was held before the Honorable 
Lmothy R. Hanson, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for 
lit Lake County, State of Utah. R. 779. 
9. Mike Vardakis and CTX agreed to settle their individual 
Laims and to pursue their claims against Harry Murphy in a joint 
inner. R. 779. 
10. On April 5, 1995, Judge Timothy R. Hanson entered the 
imorandum Decision of the trial court wherein he ruled that 
Lrolyn Murphy had an ownership interest in the property. R. 786. 
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11. On June 22, 1994, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment were filed with the trial court. R. 837. 
12. Harry Murphy, however, filed a Motion to Amend the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment. R. 855. 
13. On September 29, 1994, the trial court denied the Motion 
to Amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment. 
R. 900. 
STATEMENT OP FACTS 
1. Carolyn Murphy ("Carolyn") and Harry Murphy ("Harry") 
married in the year 1955. R. 990, 1034. 
2. Harry and Carolyn lived as husband and wife for 
approximately thirty-six (36) years. R. 990, 1034. 
3. During their marriage, Harry and Carolyn raised .children 
who play the piano. R. 994. 
4. While married, Carolyn played the piano and gave piano 
lessons to other children. R. 994-5, 1020. 
5. Finally, during most of their marriage, Harry worked 
outside the home and provided for the financial needs and desires 
7 
f the family, including the purchase of furniture, entertainment, 
nd other like items, while Carolyn worked within the home, 
aintaining the home and the couple's children. R. 996, 1021-21, 
043-52. 
6. In about 1965, Harry and Carolyn purchased a piano, a 
ason and Hamblin "BB" piano (the ,fB piano"). R. 990, 1038. 
7. Harry found the piano and paid for it from funds that he 
arned during his employment, which, at the time, were the only 
ands available to the family household. R. 990-91, 996, 1018-20, 
038. 
8. While Harry and Carolyn had the B piano in their home, 
arolyn and the children played the instrument; Harry did not 
scause he does not play the piano. R. 994. 
9. Harry stated that the main purpose for buying the B piano 
is his resulting ability to "further development of my children's 
isic ability." R. 1038-39. 
10. Also, Carolyn gave lessons on the piano and earned some 
>ney for the household through this activity. Carolyn did not pay 
mt for the use of the piano and did not pay a portion of the 
8 
money to Harry. Furthermore, she did not ask Harry if she could 
use the piano personally or commercially. R. 994-95, 1020, 1040. 
11. Carolyn and Harry maintained the piano. R. 995-96. 
12. In about 1969, Carolyn received a gift - another piano, 
referred to as the A piano. R. 1017. 
13. Carolyn was not working outside the home when the B piano 
was purchased. She began part time employment in the late 1960fs 
or early 1970's. She did not begin full time work until the late 
1970fs. R. 996, 1020. 
14. Harry experienced some difficulty in employment in the 
late 1980's and Carolyn began providing financial support for the 
family. R. 1046, 1053-54. 
15. In fact, Harry and Carolyn reached and complied with an 
agreement whereby Carolyn would pay the rent for the family 
household and Harry would pay for the other expenses. R. 1046, 
1053-54. 
16. CTX Financial is a licensed pawn broker. R. 950. 
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17. On or about December 12, 1989, Carolyn came to CTX 
inancial with the apparent intent of pawning certain items of 
roperty. The potential transaction was discussed with Carolyn, 
he discussion included an explanation of the need for payments or 
he resulting loss of the property that was pawned and the terms of 
he agreements. R. 950-52. 
18. On or about December 12, 1989, Carolyn signed a Purchase 
greement whereby she pawned to CTX the B piano. R. 951-52, 1075-
6, 1080. 
19. CTX paid Carolyn the sum of $4,000.00 for the B piano. 
954, 1075. 
20. The Purchase Agreement contains the following 
epresentations and warranties by Carolyn: 
For the sum of $4,000.00 paid to me, I do hereby sell to 
CTX Financial, 2875 South Main #101, SLC Utah, the 
property herein described, which I warrant and represent 
to be my property free and clear of any liens or 
encumbrances of any type or nature whatsoever. I further 
agree that I will pay all costs and expenses incurred in 
defending the title of said property. 
I understand and agree that if I do not exercise my 
option to repurchase said property within said period of 
time, the Pianos purchased by CTX under this agreement 
will be repossessed and that I will not make any claim 
for the return of said property. 
10 
I further understand and agree that the title to said 
property shall pass free and clear of all encumbrances to 
CTX FINANCIAL at the time of forfeiture of my rights to 
repurchase said property. 
R. 934-35, Tr. Exh. # 1. 
21. Pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, the right to 
repurchase absolutely terminated nine (9) months after the December 
12, 1989 origination date. R. 934-35, 954-55, Tr. Exh. # 1. 
22. In conjunction with the pawn of the B piano, Carolyn 
executed a Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office Uniform Pawned & 
Purchased Property Card ("pawn card"). R. 934-35, 951-53, 1071, 
1076, Tr. Exh. # 1. 
23. The pawn card was filed with the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office. R. 934-35, 952-53, 1076, Tr. Exh # 1. 
24. With the execution of the pawn card, Carolyn did "certify 
that the [B Piano] has not been obtained by any illegal means and 
is my property and is free and clear of any encumbrances and I have 
a legal right to sell it." R. 934-35, 946, 1075-76, Tr. Exh # 1. 
25. CTX agreed to allow Carolyn to retain possession of the 
B piano. Accordingly, in conjunction with the pawn, Carolyn 
executed a UCC financing statement on the piano. R. 935-36, 953, 
Tr. Exh. # 2 & 3. 
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26. The financing statement was filed with the State of Utah 
n December 12, 1989. R. 935-36, Tr. Exh. 2 & 3. 
27. The December financing statement was amended to reflect 
corrected social security number for Carolyn. R. 935-36, Tr. 
xh. 2 & 3. 
28. Finally, in conjunction with the pawn of the B piano, 
arolyn executed a Bill of Sale representing as follows: 
1 do sell . . . to CTX Financial . . . the following 
described property, which I warrant and represent 
ownership and good title to, the right to sell the same 
and that there are no liens, encumbrances or charges 
thereon, or against the same . . . . 
Property Description: 
2 mason & Hamblin Pianos #A24102 and #BB 25369 
29. On or about July 31, 1990, Carolyn entered into a new 
irchase agreement with CTX whereby CTX paid the sum of $5,500.00 
or the property sold to it through this new agreement. R. 937, 
>5, Tr. Exh. # 5. 
30. The property included in the July 31, 1990 Purchase 
freement included the same B and A pianos and two paintings (1) 
rans by Stevenson and (2) Arrangement of an Old Car by Edgar 
ring. R. 937, 955, Tr. Exh. # 5. 
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31. With the execution of the Purchase Agreement, Carolyn 
made the same warranties that she had represented before, including 
that she owned the property, it was free and clear of any liens or 
encumbrances, and that she had the right to sell the property. R. 
937, 955, Tr. Exh. # 5. 
32. On or about March 15, 1991, CTX loaned the sum of 
$3,000.00 to Carolyn. R. 938, 957-60, Tr. Exh. # 9. 
33. In conjunction with the loan, Carolyn did execute a 
Promissory Note, Security Agreement and UCC Financing Agreement, 
wherein the loan was secured by numerous collateral. R. 938, Tr. 
Exh. # 9. 
34. Carolyn pawned other property to CTX, during this same 
time. R. 936-38, 955, Tr. Exh. # 4, 6 & 7. 
35. On all pawn transactions between Carolyn and CTX, to 
repurchase the property, she was required to pay the principal 
amount plus ten percent (10%) of that principal. R. 934, 954-55, 
959, Tr. Exh. # 1 , 4, 5, 6, & 7 . To renew the ability to 
repurchase the property without repaying the principal, she was 
required to pay an option renewal price of ten percent (10%) for 
each of the months that she desired to renew the repurchase option. 
R. 934, 954-55, 959, Tr. Exh. # 1, 4, 5, 6, & 7. 
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36. On the March 1991 loan, the interest rate was at ten 
ercent (10%) per month. R. 934, 959, Tr. Exh. # 9. 
37. Carolyn was not able to repay the principal on the pawn 
ransactions, however, she did not wish to lose the property. The 
anager of CTX had grown to like Carolyn. Consequently, he 
rranged for a business owned by his family to purchase the pawn 
ransactions from CTX and to re-write the required payments so the 
ffective interest rate was lowered from 120% per annum to 36% per 
mum. The paper work, thus, was assigned to Mutual Mortgage 
srvices, Inc., the new financing company, however, Mutual retained 
le ability to reverse the assignment upon any default by Carolyn. 
938-39, 958-60, Tr. Exh. # 10. 
38. The Agreement between Carolyn and Mutual combined the 
aounts due and owing under all of the pawn agreements, being a 
)tal of $10,870.00, and took as collateral all property pawned 
id/or given for the March loan. R. 938-39, 960, Tr. Exh. # 10. 
39. The Promissory Note required payments of interest only 
-om June 15, 1991, in the amount of $326.10 each month, until 
>ril 15, 1992. On May 15, 1992, Carolyn was required to pay the 
ipaid balance of $11,196.10 to pay the pawn debt in full. 
Lrolyn, also, continued to be obligated to make the payments 
squired by the March 1991 loan. R. 938-39, Tr. Exh. # 10. 
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40. With the exception of the March 15, 1991 Promissory Note 
in the amount of $3,00.00, Tr. Exh. # 9, Carolyn obtained the money 
from CTX during the time that she was responsible for paying, and 
did pay, the family household rental expense, during 1989 and 1990. 
R. 934-38, 950-56, 1046, 1053-54, Tr. Exh. # 1-7. 
41. Carolyn told Harry that she needed money for expenses 
when she pawned the property to CTX. R. 998. 
42. In fact, the divorce complaint filed by Harry states that 
Carolyn had income of approximately $400.00 each month and that 
Harry had been unemployed since December 1989. % 7, Complaint; R. 
941, Tr. Exh. # 23. Further, the Complaint states that Harry knows 
that Carolyn was attempting to sell marital property. % 10, 
Complaint; R. 941, Tr. Exh. # 23. 
43. Carolyn defaulted on the payments owed to Mutual. R. 
939, 961, Tr. Exh. # 11. 
44. Since Carolyn defaulted, CTX was required to take back 
the debt from Mutual Mortgages and was required to initiate the 
present law suit. R. 939, 960, Tr.Exh. # 11 & 12. 
45. CTX obtained a default judgment against Carolyn and 
LeGrande Christensen. Mr. Christensen was involved in this matter 
15 
ecause he took possession of the A piano and asserted that he 
wned the same after being given notice that the piano had been 
awned to CTX. R. 940, 969, Tr. Exh. # 20.2 
46. Carolyn signed other documents wherein she asserted 
tfnership of the B piano. These include a bill of sale to Mike 
ardakis wherein she sold him the B piano, stating that "there are 
o liens or encumbrances on piano #BB25369." R. 940, 961-62, 
071-72, Tr. Exh. # 21. 
47. When Carolyn sold the piano to Mike Vardakis, in addition 
3 writing and signing the bill of sale, she told him that she 
tfned the piano and could sell the same to him. Further, she 
slivered the piano to the home of Mr. Vardakis1 father-in-law. R. 
10, 986-87, Tr. Exh. # 21. 
48. When Mr. Vardakis purchased the piano from Carolyn, he 
is informed that she had the right to sell the same and had no 
>ason to believe otherwise. See R. 988. 
49. Mr. Vardakis has paid the sum of $14,000.00 for the B 
.ano, plus costs and attorneys fees. R. 987. 
2
 Harry, also, claimed an ownership interest in the A piano, 
> the extent that he negotiated a sale of the A piano, he picked 
> the check for the A piano, he sold the piano and signed a 
tlease of interest on the A piano. Tr. 999-1001. 
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50. In about August 1990, Harry filed a Complaint for a 
divorce from Carolyn. R. 991-92, 1037. 
51. Harry and Carolyn both moved from the marital residence 
in approximately September 1990. R. 992, 1037. 
52. Carolyn remained in possession of the B piano, even 
though each party had been required to move to a different 
residence. R. 1037-38. 
53. Both Carolyn and Harry claimed ownership of the B piano 
in the divorce proceedings. R. 941, Tr. Exh. # 23. 
54. During the divorce case, Harry signed and filed a 
financial declaration that stated 
The attached Schedule A itemizes the joint debts of which 
plaintiff is aware. . . . The enclosed Schedule B 
inventories the property in the possession of the 
parties, allocates values to each of them, and indicates 
to whom the item belongs. . . . Many items held by the 
defendant and plaintiff actually belong to their 
children, Diana, Steve and David. Those items would be 
delivered to them directly. The items marked under 
Harry's name would be given to him and those under 
Carolyn's name would be given to her. The items 
identified under their joint names would be sold to 
retire the outstanding debts. The items remaining could 
be divided between them. 
R. 941, 1059, Tr. Exh. # 23. 
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55 • On the financial declaration signed by Harry and filed 
ith the Court, Harry listed the B piano under the joint names of 
arry and Carolyn. R. 1060, Tr. Exh. # 23. 
56. Although the parties eventually settled the divorce 
atter and agreed that Harry could have the piano, this settlement 
ccurred after Harry knew that Carolyn had pawned the B piano and 
ad sold the piano to Vardakis. R. 992-94. 
57. When Carolyn did not pay the obligation owed to CTX, it 
as forced to commence collection action. Harry, then, claimed an 
wnership interest in the B piano. Thus, the resulting lawsuit. 
. 961-63, Tr. Exh. # 11, 12 & 13. 
58. After commencing this action, Carolyn claimed that some 
f the other property that was pawned to CTX belonged to Diana, one 
f the daughters of Harry and Carolyn. Harry, also, made this 
laim. Yet, at the trial, Harry testified that most of the 
arniture items, being numerous and mostly antique, were purchased 
tiile Diana was a child and had not been taken with Diana when she 
oved from her parent's household. R. 1047-52. 
59. During these proceedings, Carolyn filed answers to 
titerrogatories wherein she stated that she had not made any 
18 
misrepresentations of fact concerning the ownership of the piano. 
R. 942, 1077-78, Tr. Exh. # 27. 
60. During the course of the trial, Carolyn had attempted to 
change her representation regarding ownership of the property and 
alleged that she now understood that she did not own the B piano, 
that Harry owned the piano, and that she had no right to sell the 
piano or to use it as collateral. R. 1063, 1070, 1074, 1078, 1079. 
61. Carolyn testified that she signed the documents making 
representations of ownership of the B piano, and that she signed 
the pawn cards stating that she owned the piano free and clear 
knowing that the pawn cards were to be filed "with the state". R. 
1074-76. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Carolyn and Harry purchased a piano during their marriage 
with marital property. They treated the piano as marital property 
until the resolution of their divorce, which occurred approximately 
twenty-six years after they purchased the piano. The ownership of 
the piano was contested in the divorce proceeding. In the 
meantime, Carolyn pawned the piano, and subsequently sold the piano 
to a bona fide purchaser for value, who did not have notice of any 
other claim to the piano. The trial court determined, as a matter 
of fact, that Carolyn had an interest in the piano and that 
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etermination is entitled to deference by this Court. Such 
inding, therefore, should be affirmed. 
2. Carolyn owned an interest in the piano. As a consequence 
f that ownership interest, she was able to pawn her interest in 
he piano. In addition, although her title may have been in 
onjunction with that of Harry, Carolyn could sell the piano to 
ardakis, who was a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice 
f any other claim to the piano. The trial court found the facts 
upporting the ownership interest, the transfers, the receipt of 
alue by Carolyn and the bona fide position of Vardakis. If Harry 
as any remaining claim, it must be asserted against Carolyn. The 
onclusion of the trial court should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE COURT FOUND AS A MATTER OP FACT THAT THE PIANO WAS JOINT 
MARITAL PROPERTY. THIS FINDING IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE AND MUST BE AFFIRMED 
The trial court, Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, ruled 
lat the B piano was marital property owned jointly by Carolyn and 
irry at the time of the transactions involving CTX Financial and 
Ike Vardakis. This determination arose as a finding of fact from 
LI of the evidence presented to the court. As a finding of fact 
ide by the trial court, it must be affirmed if it is supported by 
ly evidence in the record. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 
)94) . Clearly, CTX and Vardakis are entitled to have any disputed 
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evidence reviewed in the light most favorable to the determination 
of the trial court. Id. Even without this weighty standard of 
review, Harry would lose on this issue because the evidence 
preponderates against his argument and in favor of the ruling of 
the trial court. 
Further, to successfully challenge the findings of fact made 
by the trial court, "an appellant must marshal the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as 
to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them 
clearly erroneous." Wade v. Stangl, 859 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 
1994) ; Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
In the instant case, Harry has failed to adequately marshal 
the evidence. Harry states that Carolyn did not claim the B piano 
in the divorce action. Carolyn, however, did claim ownership of 
the B piano in the divorce proceedings. On the financial 
declaration signed by Harry and filed with the Court, Harry listed 
the B piano under the joint names of Harry and Carolyn. Although 
the parties eventually settled the divorce matter and agreed that 
Harry could have the piano, this settlement occurred after Harry 
knew that Carolyn had pawned the B piano and had sold the piano to 
Vardakis. The divorce Complaint filed by Harry demonstrates 
21 
'.arry's knowledge that Carolyn was attempting to sell marital 
roperty. In addition, Harry testified that although he was 
equesting only thirteen items, including the B piano, he could not 
btain a settlement for the year prior to resolution of the divorce 
ase, which agreement was obtained only after Harry knew about 
arolyn's use of the piano. 
Additionally, Harry did not refer the Court of Appeals to any 
f the documents that Carolyn signed wherein she confirmed her 
wnership of the B piano. Also, Harry did not include Carolyn's 
nswers to interrogatories wherein she stated that she had not made 
ny misrepresentations of fact concerning the ownership of the 
iano. Harry made no attempt to marshal the evidence that supports 
tie findings and conclusions made by the trial court in this case, 
nstead, Harry presented the evidence in the light most favorable 
D his case. Consequently, his appeal should be dismissed due to 
Is failure to comply with the requirement that he marshall the 
/idence and demonstrate his right to a reversal based on the lack 
f evidence supporting the determination of the trial court. 
>int l; Finding No, 6 is supported by the evidence presented at 
rial and should be affirmed. 
The piano was marital property at the time that Carolyn 
rtained money for the property from CTX and Vardakis. Finding of 
Let No. 6 and Conclusions of Law Nos. 2 and 3 are supported by the 
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evidence and the appeal of this finding asserted by Harry should be 
denied. Mr. Murphy appears to have forgotten the actual evidence 
presented to the trial court in support of the finding and 
conclusion that the piano was marital property. That evidence 
included the following: 
a. The piano was purchased for family use; 
b. The children played the piano; 
c. Carolyn played the piano; 
d. Harry did not play the piano; 
e. The piano was purchased when Harry was providing the 
financial support for the family and Carolyn was maintaining 
the household and children; 
f. Harry and Carolyn testified that each participated 
in the maintenance of the piano; 
g. Carolyn gave piano lessons using the piano; 
h. Carolyn did not pay Harry for the commercial use of 
the piano; 
i. Harry did not think it was necessary for Carolyn to 
pay him for the use of the piano or for Carolyn to ask his 
permission to use/play the piano; 
j . Harry testified that when Carolyn received the money 
from CTX Financial, she was paying family and household 
expenses, including the rent; 
k. Harry listed the piano as being joint marital 
property when he prepared and filed with the court his 
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Financial Declaration and Settlement Proposal in his divorce 
action with Carolyn; 
1. Harry was awarded the piano in the divorce decree 
only after he knew that Carolyn had pawned the piano to CTX. 
Harry argues in his brief, pp. 14-15, that there was no 
vidence of the use of the funds received by Carolyn for family 
xpenses. This assertion simply contravenes the entire weight of 
he evidence. Harry testified that Carolyn paid the rent for the 
amily household in the years 1989 and 1990. Further, his 
omplaint filed in the divorce proceeding states that he was 
nemployed and that Carolyn had an income of only $400.00 each 
onth. This is the time period in which Carolyn received the funds 
rom CTX. 
Contrary to the assertions of Harry, Mr. Wright did not 
sstify that Carolyn told Mr. Wright that she used the money for 
*r book business. Mr. Wright stated that Carolyn said that she 
sed the proceeds from the last $3,000.00 loan for the book 
isiness, not the entire funds obtained by her previously, which 
re the substantial part of the moneys due and owing by Carolyn to 
PX. 
Further, Harry asserts that the couple was separated at the 
.me Carolyn received these funds. This simply is not true. Harry 
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and Carolyn separated approximately September 1990, after the 
majority of the funds had been given to Carolyn by CTX. The first 
pawn transaction was completed in December 1989. The last pawn 
transaction involving the B piano occurred in July 1990. Again, 
this transaction was prior to the separation of the parties. In 
addition, Harry forgets that he and Carolyn continued to reside 
together on an on-again, off-again basis and were living together 
at the time of the trial in this matter. Tr. 990. 
Section 30-2-9, Utah Code Annotated, provides that M[t]he 
expenses of the family and the education of the children are 
chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife or either of 
them, and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or 
separately." The only evidence on the use of the proceeds received 
by Carolyn during 1989 and 1990, is that she had the responsibility 
to pay the rent on the family household and that she did pay this 
rent. Consequently, the B piano could be assessed with the debt 
owed to CTX. 
Finally, the B piano was purchased with joint marital funds. 
The evidence clearly demonstrates that at the time the piano was 
purchased, Harry provided the sole financial support for the 
family. Carolyn raised the children and maintained the family 
home. Harry purchased all of the furniture and other items in the 
household at that time. Consequently, the fact that Harry paid for 
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.he piano out of his checking account is meaningless as to the 
ownership of the property. 
Property that is purchased during a marriage is presumed to be 
tarital property. "This marital property encompasses all of the 
.ssets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained 
nd from whatever source derived". Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 
07 6, 1079 (Utah 1988). Further, "marital property is ordinarily 
11 property acquired during marriage and it 'encompasses all of 
he assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever 
btained and from whatever source derived1." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 
.2d 1314, 1317 (Ct. App. Utah 1990). It is true, as Harry 
sserts, that Utah law allows spouses to own property separately, 
ee § 30-2-1, Utah Code Ann. This statute is applicable, however, 
nly if the parties did own the property separately. 
In the present case, Harry and Carolyn jointly owned the B 
iano. As stated above, the facts in the record support this 
inding by the trial court. Further, even Harry demonstrated that 
ach spouse made a claim to the piano during the divorce. Harry, 
imself, listed the B piano in his financial declaration as being 
oint marital property. As between Harry and Carolyn, Harry did 
ot have a sole legal right to the B piano until August 1991, when 
tie parties entered into the stipulation to resolve the issues in 
tieir divorce. This agreement between Carolyn and Harry was made 
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after Harry knew that Carolyn had sold the piano and it was after 
all of the transactions between Carolyn and CTX, and between 
Carolyn and Vardakis. 
Finding of Fact No. 6 is supported by the great weight of the 
evidence in the record. The finding of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
Point 2: Finding of Fact No. 14 is supported by the evidence in 
the record and, therefore. should be affirmed. 
Finding of Fact No. 14 is accurate. Harry did not testify 
that he alone maintained the piano. He specifically stated that 
both he and Carolyn caused the maintenance to be performed. 
Point 3: Findings of Fact Nos. 17-19 and Conclusions of Law Nos. 
2 and 3 should be affirmed by this Court. 
Findings of Fact Nos. 17-19 and Conclusions of Law Nos. 2 and 
3 should be affirmed by this Court. The evidence presented to this 
Court that supports the Findings and Conclusions regarding 
ownership of the piano includes that delineated in Point 1, above. 
That evidence, in conjunction with the issue of credibility of 
witnesses, was considered by the Court. The issue of ownership has 
been determined by the Court on the basis of that evidence, in 
combination with consideration of the law. Neither the Court's 
decision, nor the Findings and Conclusions, hold that a married 
person cannot own property separately. In the present case, 
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Lowever, the only evidence that supported Harry's contention of 
;ole ownership was his testimony and that incredible testimony of 
:arolyn. This evidence was contradicted by Harry's own testimony 
md the various statements made by Carolyn. All other evidence 
supports the Findings and Conclusions of the Court. Accordingly, 
10 changes should be made to Findings of Fact Nos. 17-19 or 
inclusions of Law Nos. 2 and 3. 
Harry continues to argue that because he wrote the checks for 
he piano, and because both he and Carolyn asserted at the trial in 
he present case that the piano belonged to Harry, that the 
wnership issue was determined against the weight of the evidence. 
arry misrepresents the state of the evidence contravening his 
ssertion, and thus, attempts to mislead this Court in his attempts 
o obtain a reversal of the findings of fact entered by the trial 
ourt. The trial court determined that Carolyn had an ownership 
nterest in the piano based on the preponderance of the evidence. 
arry previously had prepared, signed and filed with the court a 
inancial declaration stating that the piano was joint marital 
roperty. Harry testified that he attempted to obtain a settlement 
ith Carolyn, in the divorce case, wherein he would be awarded the 
iano for an entire year and that she would not agree. Tr. 993. 
bviously, Carolyn did not agree then that Harry solely owned the 
piano. 
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In fact, contrary to Harry's assertions, Carolyn did not 
clearly testify at the trial that Harry always had owned the piano. 
Carolyn testified that she had signed numerous documents containing 
representations of her ownership of the B piano. Tr. 1074-75. 
Further, she admitted that she had prepared answers to 
interrogatories in the case at bar wherein she asserted that she 
had not committed fraud or misrepresentation of fact when she 
signed the Bill of Sale on the piano stating that she owned the 
piano free and clear and was selling the same to Vardakis. Tr. 
1077, Tr. Exh. 27. When Harry's counsel specifically asked if she 
had an ownership interest in the piano, Carolyn asserted her right 
to the protections of the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, and stated her fear of incrimination in answering 
such question. She did not say that she did not own an interest in 
the piano. Carolyn may feel guilty about selling the piano, she 
may be in collusion with Harry with whom she did reside at the time 
of trial, she may have a number of motives concerning her 
testimony. Carolyn's testimony concerning ownership lacks any 
amount of credibility. The trial court determined that her 
testimony lacked credibility and that the weight of the evidence 
substantiated her ownership interest in the piano. This finding of 
fact is supported by the evidence in the record. The determination 
of the trial court should be affirmed. 
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oint 4: Finding No. 20 is supported by the evidence presented to 
he trial court and should be affirmed. 
Finding No. 2 0 should be affirmed by this Court. Harry 
ompletely ignores the actual evidence and the considerations of 
he Court in regard to the Financial Declaration and Settlement 
roposal. Therein, Harry specifically listed the piano as joint 
arital property. He did not simply list property that could be 
old. Harry did attempt to explain the inconsistency between his 
osition regarding ownership of the piano during the divorce 
roceeding and the case at bar. His explanation was that the piano 
as listed as joint marital property because he wanted to sell the 
iano and pay off the substantial debt. Harry, however, also 
sserted that most of the debt had been created by Carolyn. 
The trial court was not required to accept the explanation 
rovided by Harry. The court was entitled to, and did, consider 
11 of the evidence in conjunction with the express listing by 
arry of the piano as joint marital property. Finding of Fact No. 
D and Conclusions of Law Nos. 2 and 3 should be affirmed by this 
Durt because they are supported by the evidence in the record. 
sint 5: Finding No. 21 should be affirmed by this Court because 
b is supported by the evidence presented to the trial court. 
The trial court is considered to be in the best position to 
ssess the credibility of the witnesses and to derive a sense of 
le proceeding as a whole. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d at 936. The 
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appellate court is not in the same position to determine factual 
disputes, and it is because of this disadvantage that the appellate 
court affords deference to the lower court. Western Kane County 
Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 
1377 (Utah 1987). Great deference should be given to the trial 
court's findings because they are based on an evaluation of 
conflicting live testimony. Matter of Estate of Bartell, lie P. 2d 
885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
Judge Hanson heard the testimony of Carolyn, Harry, CTX and 
Vardakis. In addition, He reviewed all of the documentary 
evidence, including the numerous documents signed by Carolyn. The 
trial court evaluated the testimony, determined the factual 
disputes and found the findings based on the testimony and evidence 
presented during the trial. The findings should not be disturbed 
because Harry asserts that a portion of the evidence should be 
given greater credibility than given by the trial court. 
Certainly, the trial court was in an excellent position to 
examine the credibility of all witnesses, including Carolyn, at the 
time of trial. For good and obvious reasons, the Court reached the 
conclusion that Carolyn's present representations as to ownership 
of the piano were not believable, or at least, were not decisive of 
the issue. Such present testimony certainly was in conflict with 
other testimony as well as written and verbal representations 
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oncerning ownership of the piano. Finding of Fact No. 21 and 
onclusions of Law Nos. 2 and 3 should be affirmed by this Court. 
ARGUMENT II 
CAROLYN HAD AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE PIANO, AND THEREFORE, 
SHE COULD TRANSFER THAT INTEREST TO CTX AND/OR VARDAKIS 
Finding No. 2 6 should be affirmed by this Court. The trial 
ourt found that Vardakis was a bona fide purchaser for value, and 
hus, any claim in favor of Harry should be asserted against 
arolyn. The facts support this finding and the law supports this 
onclusion. There is no support for the allegations made by Harry. 
he case law cited by Harry in support of his request for reversal 
imply is not applicable to the present circumstances. That 
uthority pertains to a thief of property. Carolyn was not a 
tiief. She had an interest in the property. A bona fide purchaser 
or value, without notice of any imperfection in the sale, does 
eceive title to the property. Harry, however, continues to have 
claim against Carolyn for any injury that he can prove. Of 
Durse, if Carolyn utilized the proceeds received from Vardakis for 
le support of the family, Harry may not have any injury 
latsoever. It is true that Harry could not be held personally 
^sponsible for the debts incurred by Carolyn, unless they were for 
imily expenses. It is not true that Vardakis is not entitled to 
*tain the use and possession of the piano. As the trial court 
:ated in the Memorandum Decision, "Mr Murphy's remedy as to the 
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loss of his one-half interest as sold by his spouse to Vardakis is 
a claim against Mrs. Murphy for having sold his interest in the "B" 
piano, and apparently for violating the divorce court's restraining 
order prohibiting Mrs. Murphy from selling property during the 
pendency of the divorce proceeding." 
The weight of the evidence, and the applicable law, 
demonstrate that Carolyn had an ownership interest in the B piano, 
she was not a thief, and she could convey or otherwise transfer her 
interest therein. 
In fact, in Whetom v. Vesco, Inc.3, a case substantially 
similar to the present case, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota 
determined that the creditor was entitled to foreclose on the 
entire property used as collateral prior to the divorce. In 
Whetom, the former wife was sued by a creditor of her previous 
husband. In the prior divorce case, the only real marital asset 
was stock ownership in a company. Prior to the filing of the 
3
 The case of Whetom v. Vesco, Inc. was referred to in 
argument by counsel for CTX Financial, Inc. during the trial on 
this matter. Along with the reference in argument, counsel 
provided to the Court the only copy of said case. The case is a 
Court of Appeals of Minnesota case and the digests that would 
include such a case are not available in the law libraries in the 
State of Utah. Further, the trial court no longer has the copy of 
the case. Counsel is attempting to obtain another copy of the case 
from the University of Minnesota, however, the law library has been 
closed. Counsel will provide an accurate citation and copy of the 
case to the Utah Court of Appeals as soon as such case becomes 
available. 
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omplaint for divorce, the husband had pledged this stock to his 
•usiness partner and had received a loan in consideration for the 
•ledge of property. The creditor, the business partner, attempted 
o foreclose on the stock after the divorce. The wife alleged that 
he husband had committed a fraudulent conveyance on her marital 
nterest in this stock. The Court ruled that there is no vested 
nterest during the marriage and that the fraudulent conveyance 
laim would not be allowed. The business partner was entitled to 
oreclose on the stock because the husband had pledged the stock 
rior to any issue of divorce. 
In Utah, the only case similar to the present action is 
learfield State Bank v. Contos, 562 P.2d 622 (Utah 1977). 
herein, the Utah Supreme Court found that the husband could convey 
is one-half interest in marital property as collateral on a loan, 
urther, the Court determined that the Bank held a lien only 
gainst the husband's interest in the property and not against the 
ife's interest. Thus, in the present case, the trial court 
orrectly ruled that Carolyn conveyed her marital interest in the 
roperty to CTX. 
In the present case, the trial court ruled that CTX would have 
btained a fifty percent interest in the B piano because Harry 
Duld have retained his one-half interest. This determination was 
ade based on the finding that CTX had a duty to investigate the 
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ownership interest because the agent knew that Carolyn had 
children. Further, the trial court determined that CTX did not 
make such an investigation. This latter determination was against 
the only evidence on the subject, that being, that Mr. Wright had 
gone to the home of Carolyn at 6:00 a.m., had looked at the B 
piano, and that no one else was in the home at that time. This 
certainly demonstrated a basis for determining that Carolyn truly 
had the ownership interest that she expressly represented in the 
documents. 
As to Vardakis1 entitlement to the piano, Clearfield State 
Bank, 562 P.2d 622, does not restrict Vardakis to a fifty-percent 
interest in the piano. In Clearfield, the Court specifically found 
that the husband who had used the household goods as collateral did 
expressly tell the bank that his wife jointly owned the goods and 
would not sign on the loan. The bank made the loan and accepted 
the collateral with this explicit restriction concerning the 
ownership of the collateral. Therefore, the bank had actual notice 
of an adverse, prior claim to the household goods, and took its 
interest subject to that claim. 
In the present case, Judge Hanson determined that Vardakis was 
entitled to the piano, not just a fifty-percent interest therein, 
because Vardakis was a bona fide purchaser for value, without 
notice of any other claim to the piano. Vardakis testified that he 
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airchased the piano from Carolyn, had it delivered to the home of 
.is father-in-law from the home of Carolyn, and that she 
epresented to him verbally and in writing that she owned the piano 
ree and clear. Further, he stated that he continued to own the 
roperty and that he had paid a total of approximately $14,000.00 
or the piano. The trial court found that Vardakis had no notice 
f any other possible claim to the piano. There is no evidence in 
he record that would contradict the finding of fact made by the 
rial court that Vardakis was a bona fide purchaser for value and 
ithout notice. The evidence supports this finding and it should 
e accepted by this Court. Accordingly, Vardakis is a bona fide 
urchaser for value, without notice of any adverse claim, and is 
ntitled to an affirmance of the trial court's determination of his 
ltimate ownership of the B piano. Section 70A-2-403, Utah Code 
nnotated, provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] person with 
oidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith 
urchaser for value." If Harry desires to pursue the alleged 
rongful action of Carolyn in selling the piano to Vardakis, Harry 
as a cause of action against Carolyn for any injury he suffered; 
a does not have a right to the B piano. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in the record supports the findings made by the 
rial court concerning the ownership interest of Carolyn in the 
Lano. Carolyn had a legal right to pawn the piano or otherwise 
36 
use it as collateral for loans that she obtained. Vardakis, as a 
bona fide purchaser for value and the assignee of the rights to the 
piano of CTX, is entitled to the B piano. Consequently, deference 
should be afforded to the findings of fact and the decision of the 
trial court should be affirmed by this Court of Appeals. 
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